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GAME OF DRONES: ROLLING THE DICE WITH UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES AND PRIVACY
Rebecca L. Scharf*
INTRODUCTION
Looking out the window, is it a bird, a plane, a . . . drone? The advent and
proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles,1 commonly known as drones, presents
real opportunities for positive societal contributions. Yet, as with many emergent
technologies, the challenges are undeniable. Undoubtedly, the breathtaking speed of
scientific and technological advances outpaces the ability of government actors to
keep stride. We have not determined the appropriate avenues for regulating them.
And while the potential regulatory issues are numerous given the wide variety of
nonmilitary2 uses alone,3 no use is more controversial than the use of drones by law
enforcement and its potential to harm individual privacy.

*

© 2018 Rebecca L. Scharf. Associate Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School
of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. My thanks to Dean Daniel Hamilton for his
commitment to high quality scholarship and generous research assistance. Many thanks also
to Cynthia Adams, Jennifer Carr, Linda Edwards, Doug Godfrey, Emily Grant, Joseph
Mastrosimone, Thomas McAffee, Lou Sirico, and Jean Sternlight for their comments on
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1
A variety of terms are used to describe “unmanned” aircraft: Drones, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (“UAV”), Unmanned Aircraft (“UA”), Unmanned Aerial Systems (“UAS”),
which refers either “to the system [or] systems in the aircraft or the aircraft ground station
system.” Donna A. Dulo, Aeronautical Foundations of the Unmanned Aircraft, in
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE 21, 21 n.1 (Donna A. Dulo ed., 2015).
The term “drone” is used throughout this Article for purposes of consistency and gender
neutrality.
2
Certainly, one of the principal uses for drones is for a wide variety of military
engagements. Discussion of military drone use, generally, is beyond the scope of this Article.
That said, to the extent that the military is responsible for the creation and unveiling of drones
and developing drone technology, there are drones and drone-associated technology
currently in use by the military that may be available to the public in the near future. For
example, the U.S. Army has created a drone that carries a 1.8-gigapixel color camera called
an ARGUS-IS. Donna Miles, Warfighters to Get Improved ‘Eyes in the Sky,’ U.S. ARMY
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.army.mil/article/49594 [https://perma.cc/U8KH-RQE6]. That
camera has a video sensor that can cover nearly twenty-five square miles from 20,000 feet
above, tracking sixty-five separate targets at the same time. Id.
3
In addition to the hobbyist recreational uses of drones, drones are being used in
weather forecasting, topographical mapping, firefighting, cinematography, farming,
infrastructure inspection and real estate photography, just to name a few. The variety of uses
will continue to increase as the technology advances and the price decreases.
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The surveillance technology already available on drones is vast. In fact, drones
are “simply the platform for enabling surveillance.”4 Drones allow law enforcement
to track the movements of large swathes of individuals at once, employing facial
recognition software and recording scores of data to be retained indefinitely. They
are equipped with high resolution still and video cameras with increasingly highpowered zoom lenses. In essence, they are flying computers with GPS, sensors,
thermal imaging devices, license plate readers, and even facial recognition software.
And they are routinely designed to be undetectable.
Moreover, it is not only the cutting-edge surveillance technology that is at issue,
but the pure physics involved. The ability of drones to hover, to fly at varying
altitudes and airspace, and to stay aloft for ever-lengthening time periods creates the
ideal surveillance agent. In fact, the time is not far off when drones may be “filling
our skies, engaged in myriad video surveillance tasks.”5 As this time draws nearer
and police engage in increasingly sophisticated and pervasive surveillance using
drones, one question remains: What role does the Fourth Amendment play in
balancing individual privacy and law enforcement in this brave new world?6
A single drone could invoke almost all the technological advances that the
Supreme Court has previously analyzed in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.7
For example, the United States Supreme Court’s most recent forays into Fourth
Amendment technological surveillance have involved a singular category of
technology, such as a thermal imagery device8 or Global Positioning System
(“GPS”).9 With law enforcement agencies across the country increasingly deploying
drones as surveillance agents, the potential to use many of the traditional
technological surveillance tools10 simultaneously leaves courts ill prepared to
address the level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny to prescribe.
At the present time, there is a dearth of case law explicitly addressing the Fourth
Amendment and drones, and Congress has not yet entered the fray in any meaningful
4

Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts
as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 370 (2017).
5
UAV Video Surveillance Drones Prepped for Take-off, SECURITY NEWS DESK (Feb.
3, 2012), http://www.securitynewsdesk.com/2012/02/03/uav-video-surveillance-dronesprepped-for-take-off [https://perma.cc/SXC2-VEAH].
6
Brendan Sasso, Senators Fear Drones ‘Buzzing Overhead,’ HILL (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289337-senators-worry-about-domesticdrone-surveillance [https://perma.cc/Q4B7-H7BZ] (quoting Senator Chuck Grassley: “The
thought of government drones buzzing overhead, monitoring the activity of law abiding
citizens, runs contrary to the notion of what it means to live in a free society.”).
7
See infra Part III.
8
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).
9
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012).
10
Drones employing cameras could “magnify and video record [a woman strolling
down the street]’s movements, actions, and the details of her vehicle’s license plate, or the
items she is carrying out of a store.” Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future
Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 21, 24 (2013).
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way.11 Many states have attempted to fill the void12 and have passed state laws
regulating drones.13 In the meantime, lower courts, which will be the first to address
11

Notably, “in Jones, Alito stressed what Professor Daniel Solove and others have
argued, which is that it would be ideal for legislatures to take a first stab at these complicated
questions, after which courts can review whether those solutions meet the constitutional
floor.” Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 803, 809–10 (2013). For Professor Solove’s argument, see Daniel J. Solove,
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1535–37 (2010). The very
suggestion that it is primarily the role of the Court, rather than Congress, to address the
intersection of evolving technologies and privacy is not without controversy. Compare Orin
S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2014) (arguing that “statutory rules rather than
constitutional rules should provide the primary source of privacy protections regulating lawenforcement use of rapidly developing technologies”), with Blitz, supra note 10, at 22
(explaining the need for courts to take the lead in developing a “technology-based” or
“design-based” approach to defining law enforcement’s use of surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment).
12
That said, states do so at their own peril as issues of federal preemption loom large.
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has acknowledged that state and local law
enforcement is in the “best position to deter, detect, immediately investigate, and, as
appropriate, pursue enforcement actions to stop unauthorized or unsafe UAS operations.”
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR
SUSPECTED UNAUTHORIZED UAS OPERATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/
law_enforcement/media/faa_uas-po_lea_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDS2-3JCA]. On
the other hand, a UAV is an “aircraft” under the definitions of the FAA’s authorizing statutes
and therefore subject to regulation by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2012). Moreover,
according to the FAA,
[s]ubstantial air safety issues are raised when state or local governments attempt
to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft. . . . A navigable airspace free from
inconsistent state and local restrictions is essential to the maintenance of a safe
and sound air transportation system. See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464
(9th Cir. 2007), and French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989);
see also Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Where
Congress occupies an entire field . . . even complimentary state regulation is
impermissible. Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any
state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”); Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1992).
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 2–3 (2015), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulatio
ns_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAM7-D36G].
13
See, e.g., Joe Sutton & Catherine E. Shoichet, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Signs Laws
Restricting Drones, CNN (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/floridadrone-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/CA29-B9PD] (describing the enactment of the
Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act, which provides limitations on law enforcement’s
use of drones in Florida). Currently 31 states have passed laws directly related to drones.
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these issues, are left with little guidance as to where to draw the line. Moreover, with
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) finalizing the first round of
regulations on drones in the summer of 2016 (albeit only tangentially touching on
privacy issues), the use of drones is likely to increase exponentially in the very near
future.14
Such an increase in the use of drones will likely put pressure on courts to
determine what level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny to apply given that drones do
not easily fit into any defined technological category the Supreme Court has
previously addressed. And yet, the very nature of the technology that a drone
engages in is not simply an issue of first impression for courts; although drones have
their own unique characteristics, the technology they employ is largely an
amalgamation of technology that the Supreme Court has previously analyzed. Since
a drone is basically an instrument that allows other technologies—such as facial
recognition, photography, thermal imagining, etc.—to be used more freely,
stealthily, and quickly, the Supreme Court is faced with issues stemming from the
use of the countless amalgamations of these ever-developing technologies.
Given the unique surveillance capabilities of the drone, the question becomes
how much leeway law enforcement should be given in employing drones for
surveillance before a search violates the protection an individual is accorded under
the Fourth Amendment. As Marc Jonathan Blitz queries, “[a]s police gain the ability
to technologically monitor individuals’ public movements and activities, does the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against ‘unreasonable searches’ place any hurdles
in their way?”15
Since a drone is in fact an “aerial vehicle,” should courts simply treat drones as
any other aerial vehicle merely taking photographs—in which case no warrant
would be required? Or, given the pervasive technological abilities of drones, as well
as their potential to engage in lengthy surveillance,16 is a drone more like GPS in
Farber, supra note 4, at 374; see also SARAH NILSSON, DRONES ACROSS AMERICA:
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) REGULATION AND STATE LAWS 82–280 (2017)
(providing the text for all of the state laws and city ordinances related to drones).
14
Pursuant to Congress’s mandate in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 122-95, § 333, 126 Stat. 11, 76, the FAA amended its regulations to adopt
specific rules for the operation of small UAS (less than 50 lbs.) UAS in the National Airspace
System. These changes address areas of remote pilot certification (14 C.F.R. § 107.61
(2018)), aircraft registration and marking (14 C.F.R. § 107.13), aircraft airworthiness (14
C.F.R. § 107.49) and operational limitations (14 C.F.R. § 107.51). The regulations do not
address privacy issues although the FAA in its Advisory Circular accompanying the
regulations articulated that small UAS operators “should be aware that state and local
authorities may enact privacy-related laws specific to Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
operations. The FAA encourages [small UAS] operators to review those laws prior to
operating their UAS.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY
CIRCULAR: SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (SUAS) 1 (2016),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KQXK6ZB].
15
Blitz, supra note 10, at 21.
16
See infra Part I.
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that a warrantless search is at odds with the Fourth Amendment? In fact, drones are
simply not like any other technology and their potential for wreaking havoc on the
fabric of privacy in our society is too great for their use to continue without
additional guidelines.
This Article builds on the work of other scholars who have urged courts to adopt
a “technology-based” definition of what constitutes a search.17 This Article proposes
the following multifactor test as a way of guiding both courts and law enforcement
as to how to use drones effectively while still protecting privacy:18
(1) What type of technology is the drone employing in the search? Camera,19
video,20 facial recognition software, GPS/cell phone tracking?
(2) What is the extent of the surveillance?
(3) How pervasive is the privacy intrusion?
Essentially, courts should apply a presumption that a warrant is necessary,
absent exigent circumstances,21 in instances where the police are surveying homes
17

See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–70 (2007) (creating a test pre-Jones for determining whether new
surveillance methods should be considered a search); David Gray & Danielle Citron, A
Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy 5 (Aug. 14, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129439 [https://perma.cc
/D8FF-4TXC]; Blitz, supra note 10, at 27–28 (advocating for a two-part design-based
definition of a Fourth Amendment search which takes place in a public space). But see
Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
354, 361 (2016) (arguing that “scholars and legislators should move beyond a warrant-based,
technology-centric approach to protecting privacy from aerial surveillance”).
18
Other legal scholars have proposed guidelines regarding the proper test for what
constitutes a search when police engage in technological surveillance. None of those,
however, have focused primarily on surveillance by drones. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin,
Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16 (2012)
(providing a codification of Fourth Amendment search-related doctrine post-Jones); Blitz,
supra note 10, at 28; Freiwald, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 50–70 (creating a pre-Jones test for
determining whether new surveillance methods should be considered a search); Gray &
Citron, supra note 17, at 30 (“[W]e recommend a technology-centered approach to
identifying and defending Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy.”);
Henderson, supra note 11, at 811–13.
19
See Chicago’s High-Tech Cameras Spark Privacy Fears, PHYS.ORG (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.phys.org/news/2011-02-chicago-high-tech-cameras-privacy.html#nRlv
[https://perma.cc/U84V-NT73] (“At least 1,250 of [Chicago’s cameras] are powerful enough
to zoom in and read the text of a book.” The camera system is also capable of searching for
images like an unattended package or a specific license plate.).
20
See Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of
Public Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 761–62 (2008) (describing how law
enforcement has increasingly used more sophisticated video surveillance).
21
United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As a general rule,
‘we define exigent circumstances as those circumstances that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
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or its curtilage when using drones. Drones are simply not like any other technology
and their potential for wreaking havoc on the fabric of privacy in our society is too
great. Therefore, a presumption that a warrant is required will combat the increased
potential of Fourth Amendment violations and provide a framework for law
enforcement and courts. The burden would then be on law enforcement to
demonstrate why it should not have been required to obtain a warrant given the
multifactor test.
To support this multifactor test, this Article addresses the history of Supreme
Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to explain how the Court has addressed
privacy concerns regarding law enforcement’s use of a singular surveillance
technology, such as wiretapping or thermal imagery. Understanding the various
issues that arise out of law enforcement’s use of a singular technology serves to
highlight the real danger privacy rights are under when law enforcement engages in
warrantless searches employing drones with multiple technologies. Part I introduces
the vast potential of combining drones and surveillance technology. Part II addresses
the current status and connection between technological advancements and their
effects on individual privacy rights. Part III explores the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. After a brief description of the history of the early
electronic surveillance cases, the discussion focuses on United States v. Katz and the
seminal reasonable expectation of privacy test. This is followed by a discussion of
the cases commonly referred to as the “Aerial Surveillance Trilogy,” California v.
Ciraolo, Dow Chemical v. United States, and Florida v. Riley, the advanced
technology cases, Kyllo v. United States and United States v. Jones, concluding with
a discussion on several post-Jones decisions. Lastly, Part IV details the multifactor
test outlined above in order to provide guidance and reasoning for courts and law
enforcement agencies.
I. DRONES AND SURVEILLANCE POTENTIAL
The surveillance capability of drones is infinitely comprehensive and adaptive,
able to record not only location information, but photograph (including taking screen
shots of computer screens), videotape, audiotape, use thermal imaging, engage facial
recognition technology, and intercept cell phone information. These capabilities
have greatly expanded with each model and technological advancement22 but also,
the sheer number of drones available and in use today has far surpassed predictions.
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’”) (quoting United
States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984).
22
Drone technology has increased dramatically in recent years. Specifically, drones can
now travel farther, both in distance and in height, and stay aloft for longer periods of time.
S. Alex Spelman, Drones: Updating the Fourth Amendment and the Technological Trespass
Doctrine, 16 NEV. L.J. 373, 411–12 (2015) (“[C]urrent drone technology typically operates
aloft only for a matter of hours, but certain UAS devices, called high-altitude long-endurance
(HALE) UAS, will have the potential to operate in the air for extremely prolonged periods
of time (even years), which will enable them to gather long-term information about the
ground, including constitutionally protected areas such as our backyards and other parts of
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[Drones] threaten to perfect the art of surveillance. Drones are capable of
finding or following a specific person. They can fly patterns in search of
suspicious activities or hover over a location in wait. Some are as small as
birds or insects, others as big as blimps. In addition to high-resolution
cameras and microphones, drones can be equipped with thermal imaging
and the capacity to intercept wireless communications.23
Technologically, drones continue to break new barriers. Some such “barriers”
may have little effect on privacy.24 Others, particularly those related to duration and
longevity, greatly increase the chance of the drone acting as the prototypical
surveillance agent. Specifically, one drone recently stayed aloft for four days straight
without refueling,25 while Boeing has plans to make a drone that would be capable
of staying aloft for ten days.26 Moreover, development has started on drones able to
remain airborne for years.27
Sensor platforms on drones also continue to become more sophisticated,
increasing their ability to conduct a variety of different types of surveillance.
Multispectral sensors are used to capture unseen information.28 Drones may carry
the curtilage . . . .”); see also Shane Crotty, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for
Fourth Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 227 (2014) (citing the time periods
various drones can stay afloat: “Drones are also capable of staying airborne for long periods
of time, several in excess of twenty-four hours”); William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil,
Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1169 (2013) (citing various military drones and how long each can
stay aloft); Melanie Reid, Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not
Elimination, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 8 (2014) (same).
23
M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30
(2011).
24
For example, one company has developed a drone worn on the wrist until the user
wishes to take photographs. At that point, the user would release the drone into the air where
it can take selfies. Kelsey D. Atherton, Wearable Drone Nixie Flies Up from Your Wrist,
POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/wearable-dronenixie-flies-your-wrist [https://perma.cc/U9T9-XLBK].
25
Allison Barrie, Enormous Phantom Eye Drone Can Stay Aloft for 4 Days, FOX NEWS
(June 6, 2012), [https://perma.cc/4VF8-JKX9].
26
Id.
27
Nidhi Goyal, New Solar Powered Drones Will Remain Airborne for Years, INDUSTRY
TAP (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.industrytap.com/new-solar-powered-drones-will-remainairborne-for-years/12492 [https://perma.cc/X42D-3T5J]. Facebook wants a drone close to
the size of a 747 that could stay aloft for months and beam down wireless signals. Clay
Dillow, Get Ready for ‘Drone Nation,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10
/08/drone-nation-air-droid/ [https://perma.cc/FKC5-MHTT].
28
Dillow, supra note 27. Multispectral sensor and imaging technology collects data
across “the electromagnetic spectrum, usually including light that is visible and invisible to
the human eye.” James Schlett, Drones with Multispectral Cameras Bring Efficiency to
High-Throughput Plant Phenotyping, PHOTONICS, https://www.photonics.com/Article.aspx
?AID=58350 [https://perma.cc/82DB-SMC5] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
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platforms that allow live video feeds, infrared cameras, heat sensors, radar, Wi-Fi
crackers,29 and which can spoof (impersonate) cell phone towers.30 The Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections in Ohio started to test the use of balloon drones to
provide continuous monitoring of two prisons.31 The United States Air Force
developed a sensor platform, called Gorgon Stare, which allows monitoring of
twenty square miles at a time using “electro-optical and infrared sensors.”32
The fact that private industry is taking notice and increasingly using drones will
likely lead to ever-increasing advances in the technology employed by drones.
Industries such as agriculture, construction, energy, mining, and film show great
interest in drones.33 For example, the construction industry plans to use drones on
large projects as an extra set of eyes to monitor construction progress and quality.34
Agriculture in California is determining if cloud seeding (a form of weather
modification that attempts to change the amount of precipitation that falls by adding
specific chemicals to the clouds) may be done via drone to alleviate drought

29

Wi-Fi crackers are devices that can defeat a local Wi-Fi network security system.
Surveillance Drones, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/surveil
lance-drones [https://perma.cc/S7PD-ZEHY] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
31
See Amanda Seitz, Ohio No Longer Testing Security Drones at Local Prison Sites,
GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/state/Ohio-No-Longer-TestingSecurity-Drones-at-Local-Prison-Sites.html [https://perma.cc/48QQ-8ANM].
32
David Cenciotti & David Axe, This New Drone Sensor Can Scan a Whole City at
Once, MEDIUM (Sept. 9, 2014), https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-new-sensor-on-thisdrone-can-scan-a-whole-city-at-once-33c314d4c763
[https://perma.cc/6B2E-QRDH].
While not technically a sensor platform, drones may also be used to carry lethal or non-lethal
payloads such as missiles, tasers, or rubber bullets. Surveillance Drones, supra note 30.
33
Dillow, supra note 27. In 2014, the FAA authorized six movie studios to use drones
for filming, the FAA’s first commercial authorization of drones in the continental United
States. Jack Nicas, FAA Clears Six Film Companies to Use Drones, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25,
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/faa-set-to-approve-filmmaking-drones-1411667976
[https://perma.cc/S4M2-NMA4].
34
John Babel, Up in the Air: The Emerging Risk of Drones in the Construction Industry,
XL CATLIN (July 21, 2014), http://xlgroup.com/fast-fast-forward/articles/up-in-the-air-theemerging-risk-of-drones-in-the-construction-industry
[https://perma.cc/MT3M-E5AC].
Moreover, despite efforts to keep construction out of public view, one authorized drone
captured aerial photographs of Apple’s new headquarters. Mark Prigg, The Spaceship Takes
Shape: Drone Footage Reveals the Foundations of Apple’s New ‘Donut’ HQ on the
Futuristic 175 Acre Building Site, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
sciencetech/article-2784069/The-spaceship-takes-shape-Drone-footage-reveals-foundations
-Apples-new-donut-HQ-futuristic-175-acre-building-site.html
[https://perma.cc/2WR9YEMK].
30
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conditions.35 Further, energy companies have already been given permission for
commercial drone use in Alaska to survey roads and pipelines in remote locations.36
Some experts opine that “the extent of [UAV’s] potential domestic application
is bound only by human ingenuity.”37 Many predict that drone surveillance will
eventually provide law enforcement with astounding information about individuals,
simply by drones’ ability to track a large number of people for a significant period
of time, employing high definition cameras and facial recognition software.38
Drones can conduct surveillance far beyond what helicopters and manned aerial
vehicles can do. Furthermore, with technological advancements in data retention
software, such tracking information can be retained indefinitely, creating the
possibility of future privacy issues.
From a law enforcement standpoint, drones have, at a minimum, three distinct
advantages over other types of surveillance: size, cost, and safety. All three can have
ramifications for an individual’s privacy. First, the variations in the sizes of drones
are enormous. There are drones, for example, that are being put to use by the Israeli
military, which have a wingspan of over eighty-five feet and weigh four-and-a-half
tons.39 And there are drones the size of a hummingbird equipped with the ability to
sound like birds or insects, allowing them to move undetected.40 It is these smaller
35
Brian Fung, Grow Lights and Drones: How California’s Drought Is Driving Farms
Into High-Tech, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/10/10/grow-lights-and-drones-how-californias-drought-is-driving-farmersinto-high-tech/ [https://perma.cc/UQV9-YC57]; see also American Farmers to FAA: Hey,
We Want Drones!, NBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/
american-farmers-faa-hey-we-want-drones-n222296
[https://perma.cc/E8HC-SXAS];
Sydney Brownstone, Could Drones Help Make Clouds Give Us Rain?, FAST COMPANY (June
23, 2014), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3032061/could-drones-help-make-clouds-give-usrain [https://perma.cc/2326-676C]. The University of Illinois is using drones to determine
the growth rate of crops and whether those crops need additional attention. Mary Kuhlman,
Farming Takes Flight: Drones Save IL Farmers Time and Money/Public News Service, PUB.
NEWS SERV. (July 21, 2014), http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2014-07-21/environment/
farming-takes-flight-drones-save-il-farmers-time-and-money/a40409-1 [https://perma.cc/
7NWU-M4PE].
36
Mike Ahlers, FAA OKs First Commercial Drone Flights over Land—For BP, in
Alaska, CNN (June 11, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/10/us/faa-commercial-droneapproval/ [https://perma.cc/U59J-EPTE].
37
ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42940,
INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2013).
38
Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
39
Joe Pappalardo, How Israel’s Biggest Drone Could Take Out Iranian Nukes,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Feb. 23, 2010), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a5056/
4346921/ [https://perma.cc/A7QB-BGWD].
40
The “Nano Hummingbird” weighs 19 grams and has a wingspan of 6.5 inches and it
can fly sideways, backwards and hover at a speed of up to eleven miles per hour.
AeroVironment Develops World’s First Fully Operational Life-Size Hummingbird-Like
Unmanned Aircraft for DARPA, AEROVIRONMENT (Feb. 17, 2011), http://investor.avinc.
com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=550835 [https://perma.cc/LLS2-DY3S].
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drones with the potential to fly undetected and mask their appearance that pose some
of the largest threats to individual privacy.
Second, drones are more cost-effective than helicopters or other aerial
surveillance, which involve the cost of personnel, maintenance, and fuel at the very
least. Drones can be purchased commercially, through Amazon.com, for as little as
$37.99,41 obviously considerably cheaper than any “manned aircraft.” As with most
advances in technology, the price of drones should be expected to decrease over
time. The extremely low cost to both law enforcement and private individuals is
undoubtedly one of the primary catalysts for the huge surge in the number of drones.
As drones become ubiquitous there will unquestionably be a further loss of privacy.
Third, deploying drones can be helpful in situations where there is risk to
human life, such as missing person searches, as well as combatting forest fires and
other natural disasters.42 For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
admits to using drones “in a limited capacity” for surveillance43 in instances where
it was necessary for “critical information that otherwise would be difficult to obtain
without introducing serious risk to law enforcement personnel.”44
In addition to the FBI’s use of drones for safety reasons, multiple other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies use drones as surveillance tools. For
example, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) has used drones for surveillance
on behalf of numerous federal, state, and local agencies, including: the U.S.
Immigration and Law Enforcement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the U.S. Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Forest Service, the U.S.

41

Product Page for RC Quadcopter, RC Quadcopter, FPVRC X5C-1, 2.4G 4Ch
Headless Mode RC Drone with Altitude Mode and HD Camera (White), AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Quadcopter-FPVRC-Headless-Altitude-Camera/dp/B01MREFV
DG/ref=sr_1_2?s=toys-and-games&ie=UTF8&qid=1488144039&sr=1-2-spons&keywords
=drones+with+camera&psc=1 [https://perma.cc/98HU-VRFL] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
42
See, e.g., THERESE SKRZYPIETZ, BRANDENBURG INST. FOR SOC’ & SEC., BIGS
POLICY PAPER: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FOR CIVILIAN MISSIONS 10–15 (2012),
http://www.bigs-potsdam.org/images/Policy%20Paper/PolicyPaper-No.1_Civil-Use-ofUAS_Bildschirmversion%20interaktiv.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8HH-SGKK];
Robin
Murphy, Drones Save Lives in Disasters, When They’re Allowed to Fly (Op-Ed), SPACE.COM
(Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.space.com/30555-beginning-with-katrina-drones-save-livesin-disasters.html [https://perma.cc/6YJU-S4TA].
43
Phil Mattingly, FBI Uses Drones in Domestic Surveillance, Mueller Says, WASH.
POST (June 19, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-19/world/40070544_1_
drones-mueller-privacy-guidelines [https://perma.cc/L7CQ-DPK3].
44
Kevin Johnson, Mueller Tells Lawmakers FBI Has Used Drones in U.S., USA
TODAY (June 19, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/19/fbimueller-irs-investigation-drones/2437993/ [https://perma.cc/TDD7-5XN3].
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Department of Energy, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, and the
Texas Department of Public Safety, among others.45 The surveillance has ranged
from aerial reconnaissance to missing person searches to drug-related
investigations.46
In many ways, data collection may be the biggest danger to privacy. While the
non-law-enforcement missions involving the surveying of land may appear to be an
innocuous use as far as privacy considerations, in conducting the surveys, the drones
necessarily collect data on individuals and their privacy. For example, the CBP has
announced plans to make the data gathered through its drone surveillance widely
available to outside agencies.47
Overall, drones bring convenience and adaptability to many physically difficult
or unrealistic tasks like never before. However, unfettered use of drones by law
enforcement in connection with technology will likely cause a damaging and longterm effect on individual Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
II. DRONES AND PRIVACY
Drones pose complicated questions regarding privacy and security. As with the
technological advances at issue throughout the history of the United States, drones
evoke questions regarding an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” when
a technological advancement is not yet “in general public use.”48 Since individuals

45

Jennifer Lynch, Customs & Border Protection Logged Eight-Fold increase in Drone
Surveillance for Other Agencies, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 3, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/07/customs-border-protection-significantly-increasesdrone-surveillance-other [https://perma.cc/74AW-23CC]. This is despite the fact that the
CBP’s direct mission is to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing the border or smuggling
drugs, the CBP allows other law enforcement agencies use its drones for other, unrelated
purposes. Kimberly Dvorak, Homeland Security Increasingly Lending Drones to Local
Police, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/
10/homeland-security-increasingly-loaning-drones-to-l/ [https://perma.cc/9ZGR-LUH5].
46
Lynch, supra note 45. Moreover, the predator drones used by the CBP have “highly
sophisticated, high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (“SAR”), color video, and electron
optical (“EO”) and infrared cameras, (“IR”) and are capable of performing Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (“RSTA”) on and tracking of multiple moving and
stationary targets of interest.” Id. The CBP was also considering equipping its drones with
“non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize.” Id. The CBP also reports using its predator
drones for non-law enforcement missions. It has conducted extensive electro-optical, thermal
infrared imagery and synthetic aperture radar of levees along the Mississippi River across
several states, along with surveying land for the U.S. Geological Survey, the Bureau of Land
Management, and the Department of Natural Resources. Id.
47
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR CBP’S PREDATOR B
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2010),
https://www.eff.org/document/customs-border-protection-2010-drone-concept-operationsreport-congress [https://perma.cc/CJ4X-XQHQ].
48
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 41 (2001).
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have at best a limited expectation of privacy in a matter held out to the public,49
government searches are largely restricted based on the methods and media law
enforcement uses compared to the evolving societally accepted expectation of
privacy. To put it simply, the more widely available the particular technology is, the
less the privacy the individual is afforded against government use.50 Or, as Joseph J.
Vacek aptly states, “the test seems to turn on whether Wal-Mart sells it or not.”51
Such variations in technology show that courts may struggle with what
constitutes a search when drones are involved, particularly given that drones can fly
at a much lower altitude than helicopters and planes.52 Individuals may not be able
to take actions to protect their privacy because they are not aware of the capabilities
of drones. For example, if a person not wishing to be identified sitting outside in her
backyard were aware that a drone could be employing facial recognition technology
she may choose to sit inside or otherwise cover her backyard.
In 2010, the FAA predicted there would be 15,000 drones purchased annually
in the United States alone by 2020.53 Instead, there were 616,000 drones registered
in 201654 and the FAA now predicts seven million drones could be purchased
annually by 2020.55
Seven million drones. The fact that a federal agency issued a report pointing to
this possibility alone should have set off alarms from those concerned with privacy
issues, let alone the general public. Yet few alarms have sounded. Some scholars
have, of course, recognized the threat to privacy posed by drones. Professor M. Ryan
Calo, former Director for Privacy and Robotics at Stanford Law School’s Center for
Internet & Society, in his essay, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, accurately predicted
over five years ago the threat drones pose to privacy, and the fact that “[e]xisting
privacy law will not stand in its way.”56 Yet, amidst the dark picture Calo paints with
references to Orwell’s Oceania, there are hints of optimism in his essay as well.
After bemoaning the stagnation of privacy law generally, he turns hopeful that the
sheer visibility of drones will serve as a wakeup call to the public: “But unlike the
49

See infra Part III.B.; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–41.
51
Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional,
Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 683 (2009).
52
At least one scholar has predicted that “[e]ventually, the UAV will replace the
helicopter as the preferred method for conducting aerial surveillance.” Farber, supra note 38,
at 8.
53
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2030 48
(2010), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/
2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z7S-2EPN].
54
Fed. Aviation Admin., Drone Registration Marks First Anniversary,
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=87049 [https://perma.cc/3X6G-F8MR] (last
modified Dec. 21, 2016).
55
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2016–2036 31
(2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/FY201636_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QUY-YQQX].
56
Calo, supra note 23, at 29.
50

2018]

GAME OF DRONES

469

debates [surrounding privacy and technology] of recent decades, I think these
arguments [that drones threaten our dwindling individual and collective privacy]
will gain serious traction among courts, regulators, and the general public.”57 That
has yet to happen. Instead, Calo’s more ominous prediction that the government
would make few efforts to protect privacy while “FAA restrictions relax and private
and public drones quickly fill the sky,” has seemingly come true.58
At this moment in time when the FAA has just issued regulations involving
small unmanned aircraft systems,59 we stand on the precipice of the unmanned
aircrafts going into “the general public use.”60 This first round of FAA regulations,
which became effective in August 2016, does not reference privacy.61 Rather,
privacy concerns have been left to legislators.62
According to Professor Calo, drones could be just “the visceral jolt society
needs to drag privacy law into the twenty-first century.”63 Moreover, Calo states
that, “the development of American privacy law has been slow and uneven; the
advancement of information technology has not. The result is a widening chasm
between our collective and individual capacity to observe one another and the
protections available to consumers and citizens under the law.”64
When considering the privacy implications of drones, the potential implications
are numerous, but one of the most obvious is video surveillance. Some scholars have
opined that there is no difference between government surveillance through
undercover agents and electronic surveillance. Anthony Amsterdam, for example,
claims to see very little difference in that

57

Id. at 32.
Id.
59
Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed Reg. 954401 (Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).
60
In August 2016, the FAA issued regulations governing drones under 55 lbs. 14 C.F.R.
pt. 107. They make no reference to privacy, but some of the key points include requiring that
drones not to fly directly above an individual who is not operating the drone; the drones may
not fly above 400 feet; and requiring that the drones must be within the “line of sight” of the
operator. Id. That said, the regulations also include a process to grant waivers from the
requirements. Id. As of July 2017, over 1,000 UAS operators have been granted waivers.
More than 1,000 FAA Part 107 Drone Waivers Granted, POINT OF BEGINNING (Sept. 5,
2017),
https://www.pobonline.com/articles/101090-more-than-1000-faa-part-107-dronewaivers-granted [https://perma.cc/5VZL-NEL4].
61
See 14 C.F.R. pt. 107.
62
See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 2015 Leg., 78th
Sess. 20 (Nev. 2015) (statement of Assemblyman Elliot T. Anderson),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/78th2015/Minutes/Assembly/JUD/Final/563.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z37F-7GSW].
63
Calo, supra note 23, at 29.
64
Id. at 30.
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[b]oth tend to repress crime in the same way, by making people distrustful
and unwilling to talk to one another. The only difference is that under
electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk to anybody in your office or
over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to talk to anybody
at all.65
However, the legal implications of electronic surveillance versus physical
surveillance diverge at the point where technology exceeds physical capabilities,
including in scope of observation, location, longevity, and resources.
In modern society, people can, and do, use cell phones to take videos all the
time.66 Such cell phone video is largely subject to the state laws governing torts and
privacy. In theory, video taken by drones would be subject to the same tort law.
Although some scholars have opined that there is no meaningful connection between
the right to informational privacy in constitutional law and the privacy torts,67
Richard C. Turkington posits that:
[t]he connection . . . between informational privacy rights in
constitutional law and torts is in the nature of the injury and not in the
character of the actor that causes the injury. It is the loss of the condition
of privacy and the intellectual tradition that is the foundation of the privacy
rights that links informational privacy rights in tort and constitutional
law.68
In considering the privacy implications of drones, the sky is the limit as far as
the ways in which advances in surveillance technology and the way they interface
with drones will increase exponentially. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
policymakers to be forward-thinking and creative in envisioning the privacy
implications for increased numbers of drones in the airspace.
A. Privacy Generally
Privacy is a commonly held value given that all individuals have some common
perceptions about privacy69 and value some degree of privacy. And yet privacy is
65
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 407 (1974).
66
Interestingly, in several recent high profile criminal cases it is the video of a private
citizen that led police to charge an individual police officer with a crime. Of course, police
can subpoena video and could subpoena video from drones.
67
See J. T. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.7(B) 5–54 (2d ed.
2001).
68
Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479,
490–91 (1990).
69
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 213, 225 (1995).
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not monolithic. For example, in his seminal law review article titled Privacy, Charles
Fried describes privacy as:
control over knowledge about oneself. But it is not simply control over the
quantity of information abroad; there are modulations in the quality of the
knowledge as well. We may not mind that a person knows a general fact
about us, and yet feel our privacy invaded if he knows the details.70
In addition to having individual personal value, privacy is also a public societal
value in that it is at the core of securing the promises of a democratic society. That
is, it not only protects the individual “as a restraint on the government or on the use
of power.”71
Undoubtedly, much of the legal discussion around privacy protections revolves
around the U.S. Constitution and the Fourth Amendment.72 But does the Fourth
Amendment protect the individual or society? As Anthony Amsterdam
provocatively writes:
Does [the Fourth Amendment] safeguard my person and your house and
her papers and his effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; or
is it essentially a regulatory canon requiring government to order its law
enforcement procedures in a fashion that keeps us collectively secure in
our persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures?73
The Constitution does “protect us from government fishing expeditions
whereby police invade the private realms of our life in search of details that would
justify subjecting us to an arrest or other seizure.”74
What is deemed to be private—and afforded Fourth Amendment protections—
is continually evolving with the incorporation of technology into our society. The
meaning of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” is expansive, and the judicial
system struggles with balancing an individual’s right to privacy and the
government’s need for law and order.

70

Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
REGAN, supra note 69, at 225.
72
U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
73
Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 367.
74
Blitz, supra note 10, at 84.
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B. Influences of Technological Advancements on Privacy
One of the primary changes around privacy law in the electronic age is how one
demonstrates a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” When individuals were
attempting primarily to protect physical objects such as diaries, bank statements, or
private letters, they could exhibit that expectation of privacy by keeping them in a
safe deposit box or a locked drawer or putting them under a mattress. If the
government wanted to find out about what books individuals were reading, their
personal hobbies and interests, or individuals corresponded with, it would be
required to obtain a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.75
Now, of course, people keep journals and diaries, bank statements, books,
Google searches and emails on telephones, which are carried with them from place
to place. The fact that this information is not locked away in a secret place makes it
more difficult to establish a privacy interest. These technological advances have
influenced privacy law. To claim, however, that there was only one wave of
“technology” that influenced privacy law, however, would be overly simplistic.
Starting with the invention of the telegraph in 1844,76 which was the first
technological advancement to facilitate private conversations almost
instantaneously, technology quickly developed to tap those communications.77
Determined to be “an outrage upon the liberties of the citizen,”78 Congress debated
whether this new medium of communication should be afforded the protections of a
mailed letter.79 After a failed congressional attempt to protect the privacy of telegram
users, the judiciary branch took control, refusing to issue subpoenas, analogizing
law enforcement’s intercepting telegrams to its opening of a mailed letter.80 States
soon followed the courts’ rulings, enacting laws that barred disclosure of telegram
communications—an early predicate to handling the many technological
advancements to come.81
Thereafter, as detailed in Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ article, The Right
to Privacy, referred to by some as the most influential law review article ever
written,82 legal scholars and the judiciary continued to struggle with protecting
75

DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
AND SECURITY 102 (2011).
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Samuel F. B. Morse Papers at the Library of Congress, 1793 to 1919, LIB.
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/collections/samuel-morse-papers/articles-and-essays/
invention-of-the-telegraph/ [https://perma.cc/2H2M-TKRN] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
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DANIEL J. SOLOVE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW § 1:3.1 (2006),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2076&context=faculty_publica
tions [https://perma.cc/KTV2-9BJ6].
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DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1978).
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SOLOVE, supra note 77, at § 1:3.1.
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Id.
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Id.
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Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (Warren and Brandeis’s “The Right to Privacy” is the
“most influential law review article of all.”); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
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privacy83 from the encroachments of technological advancements. In 1890, Warren
and Brandeis bemoaned the invention of cameras with the ability to take
“instantaneous photographs.”84 Warren and Brandeis concerned themselves with the
“numerous mechanical devices [that] threaten to make good the prediction that
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”85
In his book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin refers to three specific
technological advances of the late nineteenth century, which, he claimed “altered the
balance between personal expression and third-party surveillance that had prevailed
since antiquity.”86 The first was the invention of the telephone and “its development
into an indispensable instrument of personal, business, political, and governmental
life.”87 Indeed, within ten years of the invention of the telephone in the 1880s,
wiretapping began and police were listening in on criminal investigations. The
second innovation was the invention of the microphone and “dictograph recorder,”
which allowed third parties to listen in from far away and to record those
conversations. “The age of hidden microphones had begun.”88
The third technological innovation was that of “instantaneous photography.”89
Prior to Kodak’s invention of fixed-focus photography, individuals were required to
L. REV. 383, 383 (1960); MCCARTHY, supra note 67, at 1–8; Turkington, supra note 68, at
481 (“It is likely that The Right To Privacy has had as much impact on the development of
law as any single publication in legal periodicals.”).
83
See Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 36 (1967) (“The
law does not determine what privacy is, but only what situations of privacy will be afforded
legal protection.”).
84
The “instantaneous photographs” refers to advances in photography that took place
in the 1880s that allowed for an individual to take snapshots. Prior to this point, it would take
several minutes to take a photograph, with the individual sitting still the entire time. RICHARD
C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (2d ed. 2002);
see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 336, 338 (1967). The telephone,
microphone, and digital recorder, with ability to tap telephone lines were also
invented/developed in the later decades of the nineteenth century. TURKINGTON & ALLEN,
supra, at x.
85
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890). The Warren and Brandeis seminal privacy article was undoubtedly influenced
by changes in technology in the late nineteenth century:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must
be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what
Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone.” Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
“what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”
Id. (internal citations omitted); see Turkington, supra note 68, at 489.
86
WESTIN, supra note 84, at 338.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
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sit still for several minutes while the photographer prepared the plate. Once Kodak
created “fixed-focus” photography, “[a]mateurs could now make candid snapshots
of people and events, enabling man’s physical state, expressions, and actions to be
captured on permanent film without his prior consent.”90 Westin posits that the
American legal system did not respond to the threats to privacy from these
technological advances until the 1950s,91 some seventy years after their introduction
in the 1880s, thus demonstrating the difficulty courts may have in catching up with
technological advances affecting privacy.
Protecting an individual’s privacy in the late nineteenth century was largely
governed by traditional tort and contract doctrines, such as asserting claims of
“trespass, assault, deceit, and contract.”92 Judge Thomas Cooley’s treatise on torts
emphasized the right “to be let alone,” which routinely appeared in the early
common-law based privacy actions prior to the 1950s.93 Slowly through judicial
opinions and influential legal scholarship, privacy rights changed from protecting
one’s “person and tangible property”94 to protecting one’s sensations, emotions, and
spiritual nature.95 The following years brought roughly three hundred privacy cases96
to state courts around the country, adopting common law principles,97 similar to that
detailed by Warren and Brandeis in 1890:

90

Id.
Id. at 338–39.
92
Id. at 344–45 (“Several state courts had spoken of a right of privacy during the late
1800s in cases involving intrusion by the owner of a house into a guest’s room for purposes
of sexual assault; the introduction of a young unmarried man by an attending doctor at a birth
in a private home, assumed by the mother to be a medical assistant; and the attempt of a
promoter who took a photograph of an actress on stage in tights to use the picture for
advertising purposes without her consent.”).
93
Id. at 344.
94
Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529 (1978).
95
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 85, at 193, 206.
96
Westin postulates several reasons for the lack of surveillance-based claims including
an individual’s ignorance of the government’s intrusion on their telephone calls and the
inability to prove that an intrusion occurred without any tangible evidence, like a circulated
photograph. WESTIN, supra note 84, at 347; see also SOLOVE, supra note 77, at § 1:4.1[A][1]
(discussing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), where a
woman sued for being humiliated after her photograph was used for an advertisement, and
the court and the court “refused to recognize a cause of action because there was ‘no
precedent for such an action to be found in the decisions of this court.’”). Further, under the
available common law principles it was difficult to determine who actually had a right to
assert a claim and the extent of the actual injury. WESTIN, supra note 84, at 347. Evolving
and conflicting values involving private law enforcement, circulating mass media, and the
delay in technological expansion across the country also played a part in why so few cases
explored this type of privacy right claims. Id. at 348–49.
97
WESTIN, supra note 84, at 346.
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[T]he existing law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the
privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press,
the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for
recording or reproducing scenes or sounds. For the protection afforded is
not confined by the authorities to those cases where any particular medium
or form of expression has been adopted, nor to products of the intellect.98
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT SUPREME COURT PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Early Electronic Surveillance Cases
Privacy rights have developed over time, often in response to the government’s
use of new technologies. In the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
Court first began addressing individuals’ privacy rights vis-a-vis their personal
writings in the context of the Fourth Amendment. First, in Ex parte Jackson,99 the
United States Supreme Court held that when an individual placed a sealed letter in
the mail, the contents of that letter were subject to the warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.100 A decade later, in Boyd v. United States,101 the Supreme
Court further held that a government’s request to produce and hand over an
individual’s private papers violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.102 It was not
until the twentieth century, however, that the Supreme Court began addressing
privacy rights in light of the great technological advancements made in the late
nineteenth century.103
Since the outset of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has struggled with
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment as they apply when technological
advancements and individual privacy interests intersect. Beginning with Olmstead
v. United States,104 the Supreme Court addressed numerous cases involving
mechanical wiretapping of telephones.105 In those cases, the Supreme Court focused
98

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 85, at 206.
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
100
Id. at 733 (“The Constitutional guarant[ee] of the right of the people to be secure in
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be.”).
101
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
102
Id. at 630 (linking the Fourth Amendments’ prohibition against Unreasonable search
and seizure to the guarantee against self-incrimination protected in the Fifth Amendment so
as to provide protection to “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life”).
103
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 85, at 195.
104
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
105
Id. at 475; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–40 (1963) (finding that police
recording conversations between agent and defendant on an electronic device did not violate
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–11
(1961) (holding that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when they used “spike
mike” inserted into the baseboard of an attached house on the wall adjoining the defendant’s
house because it was an “unauthorized physical encroachment” into defendant’s house);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (holding there was no Fourth
99
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primarily on where the wiretap was placed—and the concomitant physical intrusion
on to the property—rather than the perceived level of privacy that was invaded.106
In Olmstead, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court addressed a
case involving electronic surveillance. There, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment protections were limited to circumstances where there was a
physical trespass, which, it held, did not include a wiretap attached to the outside of
an individual’s house.107 In essence, the Olmstead Court found that the Fourth
Amendment was not violated “unless there has been an official search and seizure
of [a] person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’108 for the purpose of making a
seizure.”109
B. United States v. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The Supreme Court continued to apply the Olmstead physical trespass doctrine
throughout the twentieth century to cases involving technology such as
“detectaphones” and “spike mikes.”110 In Katz v. United States,111 however, the
Court explicitly altered course, rejecting the Olmstead reasoning and the bedrock
physical intrusion (trespass) theory for finding a search to violate the Fourth
Amendment violation when police used a device called a “detectaphone” to listen to an
individual’s conversation in an adjacent office because there was no physical trespass).
106
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[E]vil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved
in tampering with the mails.”). Not surprisingly, Justice Brandeis objected to the majority’s
focus on physical trespass, opining that “[i]t is, of course, immaterial where the physical
connection with the telephone wires leading into the defendant’s premises was made.” Id.
107
Id. at 466.
108
Curtilage is generally considered the “land immediately surrounding and associated
with the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). For a more detailed
analysis of the Supreme Court’s four-factor curtilage test, see United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294 (1987).
109
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis
continued to forcefully argue—in a vein similar to which he had argued some thirty years
prior—that the Supreme Court needed to be forward-thinking in its conceptualization of the
Fourth Amendment and technological advancements:
‘[I]n the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be.’ The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing
papers from secret drawers can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Id.at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110
See, e.g., supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Amendment.112 Katz involved wiretapping technology similar to that at issue in
Olmstead,113 although the conversations at issue took place inside a public telephone
booth. In its holding, the Court explicitly overruled its decades-old opinion in
Olmstead.114
The majority held that whether the police action constituted a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment depended on whether the information had been
“knowingly expose[d] to the public,”115 irrespective of the physical location or
whether the individual had sought to keep the information private.116 The Katz Court,
rejecting the “physical trespass” property construct, declared that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places.”117 It further limited the Fourth
Amendment protection118 by stating that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”119
The “reasonable expectation of privacy test” became the core of Supreme Court
jurisprudence surrounding Fourth Amendment protection120 after Katz.121 Justice
Harlan constructed a two-part test to determine when a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.122 Under this test, (1) the person must “have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and (2) the expectation must be “one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”123 Justice Harlan’s
concurrence is intriguing on several levels. It is best known for the articulation of
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” construct. And while it purported to agree
with the majority’s opinion that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not
112

Id. at 512.
At issue in Katz, however, was law enforcement’s wiretapping of a conversation in
a public telephone booth, which would not have constituted a physical trespass or intrusion
of Katz’s property, and consequently would not have violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
347.
114
Id. at 353. (“[T]he underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded
as controlling.”).
115
Id. at 351.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Whether Katz was intended to limit the protections of the Fourth Amendment is not
without dispute. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (“Katz did not narrow
the Fourth Amendment’s scope.”).
119
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citation omitted).
120
SOLOVE, supra note 75, at 114. This is why many commentators were surprised at
the majority’s reliance on Olmstead’s seemingly antiquated trespass doctrine in United States
v. Jones. See infra Part III.D.2.
121
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51 (“But the protection of a person’s general right to
privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and
of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”).
122
Id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
113
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places,” it moved the discussion forward by then saying: “The question, however, is
what protection it affords those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that
question requires reference to a ‘place.’”124 While still rejecting the Olmstead
trespass doctrine that looked almost exclusively at whether the government had
physically trespassed on an individual’s property, Justice Harlan clarified that the
place where the search occurred is still relevant to whether the expectation of privacy
is reasonable.125
To this day, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence is
strongly aligned with concepts of privacy vis-a-vis property,126 despite the Katz
majority’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment is about protecting people and not
places.
Again, the Katz test required both a subjective expectation of privacy and an
objective expectation of privacy, or one that society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.” However, the Supreme Court has since parsed much of Justice
Harlan’s language. First, the Court has read the word “reasonable” as being
synonymous with “legitimate.”127 Therefore, an individual in the midst of
committing a crime may in fact have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy,
and that expectation may also be reasonable. For example, the individual committing
the crime may know there is no one in the bank and that he has completely and
correctly disabled the security systems. It may be reasonable for him to believe he

124

Id.
Id.
126
Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting ThirdParty Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976 (2007);
see also Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
MISS. L.J. 1, 31–32, 51 (2005) (arguing that even after the Court’s rejection of the physical
trespass of property lens for looking at privacy in Katz, the Supreme Court “has continued
to approach Fourth Amendment privacy as if it is nothing more than a spatial concept; what
I seclude from others is private; what I fail to shield is not.”).
127
The Supreme Court first substituted the word “legitimate” for “reasonable” in its
majority opinion. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). It did so without
explanation, citing only to “Cf. Couch v. United States.” Id. (citing Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“[T]his Court
uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the
person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable’ or a ‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (finding that passengers of a vehicle “made no showing that they had
any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the
car in which they were merely passengers”); see also Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth
Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More
Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 2 (2013) (arguing for
“reinstating the Katz majority holding a justifiable reliance standard reinforcing that the
Fourth Amendment protects ‘people not places’—as the better mechanism to secure Fourth
Amendment rights”).
125
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is utterly alone. There is no doubt, however, that such an expectation of privacy is
not a legitimate one and not “one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”128
Moreover, in Smith v. Maryland,129 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
opined that there are some foreseeable circumstances under which a subjective
expectation of privacy would not be required.130 He put forth the example that for
an immigrant from a “totalitarian country” who may not have an understanding of
“this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assum[ing] that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy
regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well.”131 Under such
circumstances, Justice Blackmun advocated for abandoning the subjective
expectations requirement since “those subjective expectations obviously could play
no meaningful role” in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.132
Instead, he claimed that a “normative inquiry” should be used,133 leaving
unanswered how such an inquiry should be undertaken. Professor Susan Freiwald
criticizes the Court’s decision in Smith precisely because it “avoided normative
analysis and failed to consider how much privacy the law should actually grant to
information.”134
C. The Aerial Surveillance Trilogy135
Less than a decade after Smith v. Maryland,136 the Supreme Court interpreted
the expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”137
128

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005) (“We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed
‘legitimate.’”). “The critical question, then, is whether society is prepared to recognize
Skinner’s expectation of privacy as legitimate.” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 785
(6th Cir. 2012) (Donald, J., concurring) (“[N]umerous courts have held that privacy
expectations are not diminished by the criminality of a defendant’s activities.”).
129
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
130
Id. at 741–42.
131
Id. at 740 n.5. Blackmun gave a second more-chilling example, namely, “if the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth
would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any
actual expectation [of] privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.” Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act,
56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 40, 66 (2004). For further critiques of Smith v. Maryland, see Patricia
Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1427–33
(2004); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1134–38 (2002).
135
Professor Joseph J. Vacek refers to the Ciraolo, Dow Chemical and Florida v. Riley
cases as the “aerial surveillance trilogy.” Vacek, supra note 51, 681.
136
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
137
Id. at 740 (internal citations omitted).
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narrowly in a trio of cases involving aerial surveillance.138 In fact, in this series of
cases, the Court found that evidence gathered by law enforcement through aerial
surveillance did not constitute a search. That said, in two of the aerial surveillance
cases—California v. Ciraolo139 and Dow Chemical v. United States140—the Court
alludes to advances in technology that could lead the Court to find that law
enforcement’s use of sophisticated surveillance equipment, which the public may
not even be aware exists, could constitute a search requiring a warrant.141
1. California v. Ciraolo
In the first case in this trilogy, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation when police took photographs of marijuana plants in the
defendant’s backyard from a plane one thousand feet above.142 In California v.
Ciraolo, the police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in the
defendant’s backyard.143 Unable to see through two fences surrounding the
backyard, the police obtained a private airplane and a thirty-five-millimeter camera
to fly over the backyard and take a photograph of the marijuana plants.144 The police
used their naked-eye observations and photograph of the marijuana to obtain a
search warrant.145
In determining this was not a search, the Court acknowledged the validity of
Ciraolo’s subjective expectation of privacy by erecting the fences in his backyard,
completely obscuring it from public view at ground level.146 However, the Court
found that society would not accept as reasonable147 an expectation of privacy from
surveillance that “took place within public navigable airspace . . . [given that] [a]ny

138
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210
(1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
139
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
140
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
141
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (“[A]erial observation . . . may become invasive, either
due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which discloses to the senses
those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow
citizens.”) (citations omitted). Specifically, in Dow Chemical, the Court opined that
“surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant.” Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added). In Florida v.
Riley, although the alleged search involved pictures taken with a telephoto lens, the Court
took pains to articulate that the police officer had identified the marijuana with his “naked
eye,” leaving open the possibility of a different result in a case involving more advanced
technology. 488 U.S. at 448–49.
142
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
143
Id. at 209.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 209–10.
146
Id. at 211.
147
Id. at 214.
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member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed.”148
Ciraolo could not escape from the routine of flight and use of public airways
one thousand feet above his backyard. However, the Court did note that this type of
aerial observation may become invasive by physical intrusiveness or “through
modern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects
or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.”149
2. Dow Chemical v. United States
On the same day, the Court held similarly in Dow Chemical v. United States
that taking aerial photographs from publicly navigable airspace was not a Fourth
Amendment violation.150 The Court determined that mere enhancement of the naked
eye through the use of an aerial mapping camera did not constitute a search.151 In
Dow Chemical, a chemical manufacturing company, which barred ground level
public view of its plant and investigated low-level flights above its plant, denied the
EPA’s request for an on-site administrative inspection.152 In response, the EPA hired
a commercial aerial photographer with an aerial mapping camera to take
photographs of the plant, which Dow Chemical argued was beyond the EPA’s
statutory right of site inspection.153
Holding that taking “aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment,”154 the
Court looked carefully at the type of camera technology that was used—“a
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking”—
as well as the absence of visible intimate details captured in the picture.155 Though
the Court did not find it applicable in the present case, it hypothesized that there may
be some instances where warrantless government surveillance of private property
could constitute a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Here, though,
instead of focusing on physical intrusiveness or technology “which discloses to the
senses . . . intimate associations,”156 as it had in Ciraolo, the court focused on the
type of technology: “surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite

148

Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 215 n.3.
150
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
151
Id. at 238.
152
Id. at 229.
153
Id. at 229–30.
154
Id. at 239.
155
Id. at 238.
156
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986). According to Kyllo, “in Dow
Chemical we observed that the enhanced aerial photography did not reveal any ‘intimate
details.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (citing Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at
238).
149
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technology . . . [or] [a]n electronic device to penetrate walls or windows as to hear
and record confidential discussions”157 may be unconstitutional without a warrant.158
3. Florida v. Riley
Concluding the trilogy, in Florida v. Riley,159 the Supreme Court held that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation when police flew a helicopter over defendant’s
backyard at approximately four hundred feet and took photographs of the marijuana
growing below.160 In Riley, after the police were unable to observe Riley’s backyard
to confirm an anonymous tip that he was growing marijuana, the police used a
helicopter to observe the backyard. 161 While four hundred feet above the ground, the
police observed two open sides of a greenhouse and took photographs using a
telephoto lens of the marijuana growing inside.162 The officers used the photograph
to obtain a search warrant, which resulted in Riley’s arrest for possession of
marijuana.163
The plurality determined that the two exposed sides of the greenhouse subjected
Riley to a reasonably objective search from the public airspace above.164 Similar to
the fixed-wing planes in Ciraolo, helicopters are routinely used in public airways,
and the helicopter stayed at an altitude in accordance with laws and regulations.165
Further, because of the low altitude, as compared to the plane at one thousand feet
in Ciraolo, the plurality focused on whether the helicopter interfered with the
defendant’s normal use of his property during the flight. The Court held that society
would accept the use of a helicopter as reasonable because “no intimate details
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no
undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”166

157

Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238–39.
Id. Although partially concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Powell wrote a
dissent criticizing the analysis of the majority, claiming the majority had abandoned the
principles of Katz by focusing on the method of the search rather than the scope of the right
being protected. Id. at 246–48 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
160
Id. at 450–52.
161
Id. at 448. The deputy took photographs from the helicopter, but the trial judge
accepted that the deputy could identify the marijuana without the use of the camera. State v.
Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The Supreme Court found that the
deputy had identified the marijuana with his “naked eye.” Riley, 488 U.S. at 448–49.
162
Riley, 488 U.S. at 448–49.
163
Riley, 476 So. 2d at 1355.
164
Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
165
Id. at 451.
166
Id. at 451–52.
158
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4. The Aftermath of the Aerial Surveillance Trilogy
The aerial surveillance trilogy brought new and additional considerations for
other courts addressing aerial surveillance issues. The Court in Ciraolo focused on
whether the surveillance took place within publicly navigable airspace.167 Dow
Chemical took the discussion beyond that, focusing on the type of technology
used.168 Lastly, Riley focused on the altitude of the aerial surveillance tool and
whether the defendant’s normal use of property was interfered with.169
Although the Supreme Court has never found that any type of aerial
surveillance is a search,170 lower courts have struggled with applying this
precedent, 171 particularly when determining the altitude from which an aircraft is
allowed to view private property. For example, the Eighth Circuit found it was not
a search under the Fourth Amendment when the defendant could not prove that
flights at one hundred feet “are so rare as to make aerial surveillance at that level
unreasonable.”172 The Fourth Circuit similarly found that a helicopter flying as low
as thirty-five feet over a defendant’s property did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search where the prosecution proved that the flights were in compliance
with FAA regulations and “such flights were a regular occurrence in the area.”173
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence
in a per curium opinion, stating that “[i]f, in fact, the officers were flying at an
altitude of 125 to 150 feet, their disturbance of the home would interfere with the
defendant’s normal use of his premises.”174
D. The Advanced Technology Cases
In an unexpected divergence from the aerial surveillance cases decided a mere
decade earlier,175 the Supreme Court found the use of advanced technology
constituted a search in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. Specifically, the Court raised the additional concerns of whether the
technology used was in general public use, whether the technology was monitoring
the home, and the duration of the surveillance.

167

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986).
169
Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52.
170
See supra Part III.C.
171
See Pew v. Scopino, 904 F. Supp. 18, 25 (D. Me. 1995) (criticizing the “unhappy
state of Supreme Court precedent” in the area).
172
United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
173
United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 434–35 (4th Cir. 2002).
174
United States v. Saltzman, 992 F.2d 1218, 1993 WL 100082, at *3 (6th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam).
175
Vacek, supra note 51, at 682–83.
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1. Kyllo v. United States
Although the aerial surveillance trio suggests that the government has broad
discretion in surveillance of private property, such discretion is not unfettered, at
least when it comes to technology that is not yet commonly used by the public.176 In
Kyllo v. United States,177 the Supreme Court held that police use of thermal imaging
technology to detect whether marijuana was being grown inside a home was
considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and “presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”178
In Kyllo, a federal law enforcement agent suspected Kyllo of growing
marijuana in his triplex home.179 Because indoor marijuana ordinarily requires highintensity heat lamps to grow, two agents, while sitting in their car across the street,
briefly employed a thermal imager to determine whether the amount of heat
emanating from Kyllo’s home was consistent with high-intensity heat lamps.180
Based on the readings from the thermal imager, as well as testimony from informants
and utility bills, the agents obtained a warrant and searched Kyllo’s home, where
they found an “indoor growing operation” with over one hundred marijuana
plants.181 Kyllo was charged with manufacturing marijuana182 and pled guilty after
the District Court denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
home.183 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo had made no attempt to conceal
the heat escaping from his home and the imager did not expose any intimate
details.184
In explaining its holding that using a thermal imaging device to scan an
individual’s home was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant, the Court
declared that “[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are upon this

176

The real question is whether the Court would look at unmanned aerial systems as it
has in the aerial surveillance cases or whether it will be viewed as “new technology” as in
Kyllo.
177
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
178
Id. at 40.
179
Id. at 29.
180
Id. at 29–30. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation that is emitted from all
objects but is not visible without use of technology such as a thermal imager. Id.
181
Id. at 30.
182
Kyllo was specifically charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Id.
183
Id.
184
“The court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy
because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home and even if he
had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager ‘did not
expose any intimate details of Kyllo’s life.’” Id. at 31 (citation omitted). Scalia takes on this
“intimate details” argument by implying that it is not whether the details are intimate or not
that matters but instead the fact that Dow Chemical involved “aerial photography of an
industrial complex, which does not share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.” Id.
at 37.

2018]

GAME OF DRONES

485

power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”185 The majority
explained that one of the many reasons Kyllo had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home was that the thermal imaging scanners were not in “general
public use.”186
The Court thus emphasized the importance of privacy given the “sanctity of the
home,” as the Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never depended on the
“quality or quantity of information obtained.”187 Instead, in the home “all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes.”188 However, the Court found that limiting the prohibition of the thermal
imaging to “intimate details” is incorrect in principle and in practicality.189 Instead,
courts should focus on whether a device is within general public use, and used “to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion.”190
Justice Stevens’ scathing dissent recognizes the possible effects of the
majority’s decision on the expectation of privacy.191 The dissent criticized the
expansive treatment of the expectation of privacy afforded to the home and
disagreed with hinging the determination as to whether government surveillance
constitutes a search on whether the device used by the government is “in general
public use.”192 Specifically, the dissent argued that thermal imaging technology was
readily available for “commercial, personal, or law enforcement purposes, and is
just an 800-number away from being rented from ‘half a dozen national companies’
by anyone who wants one.”193 Inevitable privacy concerns and intrusive technology
becoming more readily available supported the dissent’s position that looking at

185

Id. at 34. Although Scalia says this at the beginning of the opinion, he spends most
of the opinion elucidating the importance of the “home,” which appears to directly
contravene the language in the majority opinion in Katz, recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
186
Id. at 40. See also id. at 36 (“While the technology used in the present case was
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or development.”).
187
Id. at 37.
188
Id. (emphasis in original). He compares the physical search of the home in Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), which involved the “registration number of a phonograph
turntable” with the heat emanating from Kyllo’s residence, which seems like a stretch. These
were “details of the home, just as was the detail of how warm—or even how relatively
warm—Kyllo was heating his residence.” Id. at 38.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 40.
191
Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The supposedly ‘bright-line’ rule the Court has
created in response to its concerns about future technological developments is unnecessary,
unwise, and inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.”). Justice Stevens was joined by then
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.
192
Id. at 46–47.
193
Id. at 47 n.5.
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whether technology is in general public use is unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment.194
2. United States v. Jones
In United States v. Jones,195 the Supreme Court held that using and attaching a
GPS tracking device to an individual’s vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements
was a Fourth Amendment search.196 The defendant in Jones was suspected of drug
trafficking and targeted by the FBI and local police.197 The government sought
evidence to obtain a search warrant for Jones’ wife’s truck.198 While parked in a
public parking lot, the officers installed a GPS tracker on the under carriage of the
truck.199 For the following twenty-eight days, the government tracked the vehicle’s
movements through satellite signals, resulting in more than two thousand pages of
data.200 After the government obtained an indictment against him for multiple drugrelated offenses, Jones moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the government
through the GPS device.201
The district court granted Jones’ motion to suppress in part concerning the GPS
data from when the car was parked in the garage at Jones’ residence, and denied in
part for the remaining data.202 In doing so, the district court held that an individual
“has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”203 The first trial ended in a hung jury, and after being indicted, charged,
and faced with the same GPS data a second time, Jones was sentenced to life in
prison.204

194

Id. at 47.
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
196
Id. at 404–05.
197
Id. at 402. In addition to the GPS device, the police employed a plethora of
investigative techniques, including visual and camera surveillance of Jones’s place of
business and installation of a pen register and wiretap of Jones’s cell phone. Id.
198
Id. The warrant that issued from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
authorized the government to install the device within ten days and to do so in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 402–03. The fact that the government did not install the device until after
the ten days had expired—on the 11th day—and did so in Maryland rather than the District
of Columbia, lead the courts to treat this as a warrantless search. Id. at 403 n.1 (“In this
litigation, the Government has conceded noncompliance with the warrant and has argued
only that a warrant was not required.”).
199
Id. at 403. Although the vehicle was registered to Jones’s wife, the government
conceded that Jones was “the exclusive driver.” Id. at 404 n.2. (internal quotations omitted).
The Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that the fact that the car was registered in his
wife’s name did not preclude Jones from bringing a Fourth Amendment claim. Id.
200
Id. at 403.
201
See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 87 (D. D.C. 2006).
202
Id. at 88.
203
Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
204
Jones, 565 U.S. at 403–04.
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The D.C. Circuit reversed and found that admitting the data obtained by the
government through the warrantless use of GPS system constituted a search and thus
violated Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights in United States v. Maynard.205 The circuit
court referenced the use of law enforcement’s “mosaic theory” regarding
surveillance, finding that “[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear
of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.”206
The Court returned to the trespass analysis from Olmstead, noting that “[t]he
text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property,” and
“[c]onsistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied
to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”207 The
Court opined that it need not address the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
because the Katz “test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”208 Further, in finding that there was a Fourth Amendment violation,
the Supreme Court distinguished the Court’s previous rejection of two Fourth
205

615 F.3d 544, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 562 (quoting C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)). Moreover, it
distinguished the type of “surveillance” at issue in Knotts with the month-long constant
prolonged surveillance in Maynard:
206

Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and
what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a
person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a
church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does
one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of
a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office
tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a
baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular
at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact
about a person, but all such facts.
Id. At issue in Knotts was the use of GPS to monitor a “single trip” and the Knotts Court
“pointedly acknowledged and reserved for another day the question of whether a Fourth
Amendment issue would be posed if ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country [were] possible.’” People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (N.Y. 2009) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). In Knotts, the Supreme Court held there was no Fourth
Amendment violation where a beeper was placed in a container of chloroform with the
permission of the container’s owner before the container came into the defendant’s
possession. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–85 (1983); see also Renée McDonald
Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 409, 457 (2007) (The United States Supreme Court decision in Knotts should not be
read to permit warrantless “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.”
(quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284)).
207
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
208
Id. at 409.
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Amendment challenges involving the government’s placing of “electronic tracking
devices” or “beepers” into containers, allowing police officers to monitor the
location of the containers.209
Other Justices noted various concerns with the majority’s holding, which
foreshadows the potential effects on the right to privacy in future cases. Specifically,
Justice Alito noted that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy” 210 and, as such, likely conflicts with
the Fourth Amendment.211 Along the same lines, Justice Sotomayor posited that the
majority opinion in Jones “provides little guidance on ‘cases of electronic or other
novel modes of surveillance that do not depend on a physical invasion on
property.’”212 Sotomayor warned of the danger to privacy of long-term surveillance:
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . The
government can store such records and efficiently mine them for
information years into the future. . . . And because GPS monitoring is
cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and
community hostility.’213
E. Post-Jones Circuit Court Difficulties
1. Seventh Circuit: United States v. Flores-Lopez
Not long after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones, the lower courts
demonstrated the difficulties they would have in following the reasoning of the
majority opinion, despite its supposed “bright-line technological search rule.”214 For
example, in United States v. Flores-Lopez,215 the Seventh Circuit issued a decision
holding that a warrantless search by the police of a defendant’s cell phone in order
to identify his cell phone number did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
search was only “minimally invasive,” a standard the Seventh Circuit created pre-

209

Id. at 408.
Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (positing that although “short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society
has recognized as reasonable . . . [b]ut the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
211
Id. at 430–31.
212
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S.
at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
213
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
214
See Sobel et al., supra note 127, at 34.
215
670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
210
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Kyllo and Jones.216 The standard, however, was at odds with the majority opinion in
Kyllo, which stated that Fourth Amendment violations have “never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”217
Although the Seventh Circuit held in Flores-Lopez that the warrantless search
of the cell phone was reasonable, it did acknowledge that “[t]he potential invasion
of privacy in a search of a [smart]phone is greater than in a search of a ‘container’
in a conventional sense even when the conventional container is a purse that contains
an address book (itself a container) and photos.”218 Moreover, the court
acknowledged that, for purposes of Fourth Amendment searches, smartphones are
unlike other personal objects because they “hold so much personal and sensitive
information touching on many private aspects of life [and there] is a far greater
potential for the ‘inter-mingling’ of documents and consequent invasion of privacy
when police execute a search for evidence on a computer”219 because “[e]ven the
dumbest of [smart]phones give the user access to large stores of information.”220
Despite recognizing the level of invasiveness related to a search of a cell phone,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of the search primarily because the individual
had no expectation of privacy in the telephone number since he had already disclosed
the information to a third party, his cell phone company.221 Such a finding brings to
the forefront yet another reason that the third party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital
age,” as opined by Justice Sotomayor in Jones.222 Nonetheless, the court’s reliance
on this doctrine in this case was at odds with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kyllo
and Jones.223
2. Sixth Circuit: United States v. Skinner
Shortly after Jones, the Sixth Circuit found that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation when police used GPS technology to track a defendant’s
phone.224 In United States v. Skinner,225 the police used GPS technology to track the
“pay-as-you-go” cell phone that defendant Skinner used as part of his drug

216

Id. at 807 (citing United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172–73 (7th Cir.

1991)).

217

Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 805.
219
Id. at 806 (quoting United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011)).
220
Id.; see also Sobel et al., supra note 127, at 37 (“Since smartphones contain a wealth
of intimate information in the form of text messages, e-mails and other personal data, it is
highly likely that an average member of the community would be outraged or at least strongly
object to the police rifling through one’s smartphone merely as an incident to arrest.”).
221
Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 807.
222
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
223
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (warning against leaving citizens “at the mercy of
advancing technology”).
224
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012).
225
Id.
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trafficking courier activities.226 Law enforcement used the GPS to track the data
emanating from Skinner’s phone,227 and tracked him to a motorhome parked at a
truck stop. Officers conducted a perimeter dog sniff around the motorhome, which
alerted them to possible drugs inside.228 The officers entered the home, discovered
over one thousand one hundred pounds of marijuana, and arrested Skinner.229 Prior
to trial, Skinner moved to suppress the evidence found in the motorhome, alleging
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officers’ use of the GPS data
emanating from his cell phone.230 The district court denied the motion to suppress
because Skinner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone
or the motorhome because he was traveling on a public thoroughfare.231
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the determination that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation because Skinner had no “reasonable expectation of privacy in
the data given off by his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone.”232
Therefore, “[b]ecause authorities tracked a known number that was voluntarily used
while traveling on public thoroughfares, Skinner did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the GPS data and location of his cell phone.”233
The court noted the differences between Jones in that the majority opinion
“explicitly relied on the trespassory nature of the police action”234 and “no such
physical intrusion occurred in Skinner’s case.”235 Additionally, the court
acknowledged that Skinner was using the cell phone for criminal purposes, stating
“[i]f a tool used to transport contraband gives off a signal that can be tracked for
location, certainly the police can track the signal.”236 Thus, the type of technology
used, the amount of time monitored, and the location of what was being monitored
were all-important factors in the court’s decision.
3. Riley v. California
A unanimous Supreme Court in Riley v. California237 held that police should
not be permitted to search cell phones without a warrant or exigent circumstances.238
226

Id. at 774.
The law enforcement “authorities obtained an order from a federal magistrate
judge . . . authorizing the phone company to release subscriber information, cell site
information, GPS real-time location, and ‘ping’ data” for two pay-as-you-go phones,
including the one used by Skinner. Id. at 776.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 776–77.
232
Id. at 777.
233
Id. at 781.
234
Id. at 779.
235
Id. at 780.
236
Id. at 777.
237
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
238
Id. at 2493–95.
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Riley consisted of two cases in which officers seized cell phones from the
defendants, and subsequently searched them in detail.239 The contents on the phone
led police to other evidence and ultimately charged both defendants with additional
crimes.240 Riley moved to suppress the cell phone evidence, arguing the officers did
not have a warrant and there were no exigent circumstances to support the search.241
In finding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
officers searched their cell phone without a warrant or exigent circumstances, the
Court had to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applied to cell
phones.242 The Court emphasized the pervasiveness of cell phones with their
tremendous storage capacity.243 Additionally, the Court held that the “container
doctrine,” which established a per se rule that police could seize and open personal
objects found on an individual they were arresting,244 did not extend to “opening”
cell phones.245 There was no risk to the officer that there was a weapon inside the
phone (so no necessity based on danger) and there was no danger of losing evidence
because the police could seize the phone and likely just turn the phone off.
There is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not
physical records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a
cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their
day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it
contains, who is the exception.246
For over a century, courts struggled with and ultimately steered away from the
early common law concepts that once protected one’s privacy rights. Courts shifted
away from the early wiretapping cases that focused primarily on the location of the
technology to Katz which employed both objective and subjective considerations to
determine if one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. More recently, in the
advanced technology cases, courts narrowed and refined the broad discretion that
had been given to the government in earlier decisions. Focusing heavily on the type
of technology used and its availability to the public, the courts in Kyllo, Jones, and
the post-Jones opinions deviated from the early technology-based decisions,
exploring the perceived level of privacy invaded by the governmental action. As
new technologies provide novel ways to pierce the private sphere, the government
no longer has to trespass or be seen in order to accumulate information on an
individual’s life. Given the amalgamation of technologies at issue with drones,
239

Id. at 2480–82.
Id. at 2480–83.
241
Id. at 2481.
242
Id. at 2484.
243
Id. at 2490.
244
This doctrine was originally established in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
233–37 (1973), when the Supreme Court allowed that a cigarette pack an arrestee had on
their person could be removed and opened without a warrant.
245
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477–91.
246
Id. at 2490.
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courts must ensure that Fourth Amendment rights are protected in the face of rapid
technological advances and employment of drones.
V. FACTORS TEST TO ASSIST COURTS WHEN FACED WITH A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH BY LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYING DRONES
Now that police have the ability to extensively monitor individuals’ public
movement and activities by using drones and other technology, how should courts
analyze the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches” in the
context of drones?
Some scholars argue for a technology-based approach to determining what
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. David Gray and Danielle Citron
propose that the use of any technology, including aerial drones, would be a search if
that technology could “facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that
intrude upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.”247 According to Gray
and Citron, the key is that these broad-based modern surveillance technologies “raise
the same specter of authoritarianism for modern citizens that ‘broad and
indiscriminate use of physically invasive searches and seizures’ did for our
predecessors.”248
Although not specifically in the context of drones, Susan Freiwald proposes a
four-factor test synthesized from the Supreme Court and lower courts in addressing
video surveillance or wiretapping in the home or private spaces.249 Under this test,
police engagement in public surveillance would be considered a search based on the
following factors:250 (1) it is hidden, that is, the surveillance target is not aware of it;
(2) it is intrusive, that is, it grants police access to things that individuals would
consider private; (3) continuous, that is, it denotes a series of intrusions rather than
a single intrusion; (4) indiscriminate, in that it “gathers up more information than
necessary to establish guilt.”251
This Article proposes a series of factors for courts to apply to determine
whether a warrantless search by a law enforcement deploying drones has crossed the
Constitutional line in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to
privacy:
1. What type of technology is the drone employing in the search?252
2. What is the extent of the surveillance?
3. How pervasive is the privacy intrusion?

247

Gray & Citron, supra note 17, at 5.
Blitz, supra note 10, at 78 (quoting Gray & Citron, supra note 17, at 27).
249
Unlike Gray and Citron’s work, however, Freiwald’s work does not specifically
discuss unmanned aerial systems.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
For example, camera, video, facial recognition software, GPS, thermal imagery
recognition technology.
248
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This test, unlike Freiwald’s, urges the court to consider the type of technology
used, its individual capabilities, and its combined potential when affixed to a drone
with other equipment. With each technological advance, the capabilities and
precision increases, and these increases must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Further, in contrast to Freiwald’s test and the fact-specific precedent of case law
where each factor may be considered in isolation or may not apply in every case,
this test requires each factor to be considered almost simultaneously, under the
totality of the circumstances of the case at hand.
This test seeks to encourage courts to look at how the drone itself, and its
equipped technologies, were used. Moreover, the court must consider the interplay
of multiple technologies in analyzing the second and third factors, allowing for a
totality of the circumstances approach in determining the reasonableness of the
surveillance.
A. What Type of Technology Is the Drone Employing in the Search?
A court faced with a drone surveillance issue would first address what type of
technology is being used on that specific drone—camera, video, facial recognition
software, GPS/Cell Phone253 tracking—noting that a drone may be fitted with
several technologies working in combination. In reviewing the technologies used,
the more precise the technology is, the greater implication of privacy rights. As
found with law enforcement surveillance tracking, “[w]hat the technology yields and
records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply
of where we go, but by easy reference, of our associations—political, religious,
amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional
and avocational pursuits.”254
As technology advances, the ability and opportunity to record private activities
increases, requiring courts to take a focused look at the actual technological
equipment used in the case before them. Not only are there significant differences
in what information can be captured using GPS versus a camera, but the quality of
the information varies greatly depending on whether, for example, a camera records
standard resolution still images or high definition video.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court stated that the police using sense enhancement
technology would not constitute a search if that technology were “in general public
use,” unless the police used it to surveil a home or other private environment.255 This
general public use test has been criticized heavily by many scholars.256 As Marc
253

91 percent of adults in the United States own a cellphone. Cell Phone Ownership
Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cellphone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/ [https://perma.cc/YMZ4-MPAU] (last visited Apr. 8,
2018).
254
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–2000 (N.Y. 2009).
255
Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
256
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 57–58, 62–65 (2007); see also Douglas
Adkins, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment “General Public Use”
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Blitz writes, “critics are right to argue that the Supreme Court would invite chaos
and confusion if what counted as a search changed each year as new technologies
and cultural practices transformed the way people interact with public space.”257
Further, in his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito identified specific problems
with Katz’s expectation of privacy test particularly as it applies to new developments
in technology.
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense
of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even
if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new
technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable.258
“General public use” is a problem for a variety of practical reasons, the least of
which is how a court or a magistrate would measure it. Would it, for example, be
locality specific, or a national measure? What about technology that was arguably
not commonly in the hands of the public at the time of the alleged search but was in
the public use at the time of the court challenge? Just such a possibility exists with
drones at this very moment. As a result of the FAA regulations, the number of drones
within the public use is already skyrocketing, undoubtedly increasing the risks to
public privacy. Perversely:
[t]hat would mean that, even as enhancements to aerial drones and GPS
units make these devices a greater threat to privacy, their use by police
would paradoxically become subject to less Fourth Amendment
oversight—as long as private citizens are able to purchase and use such
surveillance technology for their own purposes.259

Standard for Emerging Technologies But Fails to Define It: Kyllo v. United States, 27 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 245, 262 (2002); David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth
Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996) (positing
that the kind of “technology the public can possess may change with surprising speed”);
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through
Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2002)
(noting that courts will have to “deal with the rapid pace of technological development in
deciding whether something is in general public use”).
257
Blitz, supra note 10, at 76.
258
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012).
259
Blitz, supra note 10, at 77.
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Law enforcement agencies have more access to the latest drone technologies,
which are not always available to the public.260 The varied types of surveillance
equipment that can be attached to law enforcement drones make such drones
potentially much more intrusive than hobbyist drones.261 Hobbyist and commercial
drones may fly at similar heights and record video similar to that of a law
enforcement controlled drone, but the law enforcement drone can stay aloft
significantly longer, record wider angles and better quality footage, and coexist with
other technologies like thermal scanners and biometric tools.262
Thus, under this factor, the court in each case should consider the capabilities
and characteristics of the drone itself,263 what surveillance technology was employed
by the drone, how precise each type of technology is, and whether the technology is
available for public use.
B. What Is the Extent of the Surveillance?
In addressing the second factor, the court should look to the extent of the
surveillance—the more invasive the intrusion the more that individuals expect
privacy and the less reasonable the search becomes. The court should look to how
the information is being collected: the duration of the surveillance, how continuous
the surveillance is, the location of the surveillance, etc. After all, “[m]embers of a

260

MATTHEW FEENY, CATO IINST., SURVEILLANCE TAKES WING: PRIVACY IN THE AGE
OF POLICE DRONES 3 (2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa807_1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/M89L-MZJK].
261
Id.
262
Id. In looking to whether the technology used is in the “general public use,” the court
must consider the quality of the technology—not the type. For example, in 2012, the Los
Angeles County Sherriff’s department tested mass surveillance when it employed a civilian
aircraft, capturing a 10-square mile radius of Compton, without informing the public. Conor
Friedersdorf, Eyes Over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/sheriffs-deputy-comparesdrone-surveillance-of-compton-to-big-brother/360954/
[https://perma.cc/2ASZ-DUG7].
While this technology was demonstrated on a manned aircraft, if purchased by a law
enforcement agency, it would be utilized on drones. An employee of the company owning
those drones stated, “[w]e literally watched all of Compton during the times that we were
flying, so we could zoom in anywhere within the city of Compton and follow cars and see
people.” Id.
263
Because of the quick evolution of drone capabilities and the technologies affixed to
them, courts have hypothesized how these changes will affect the privacy discussion. For
example, the New Mexico Supreme Court in 2015 briefly noted the state appellate court’s
suggestion that “when considering privacy interests under our State Constitution we move
away from an intrusion analysis in anticipation of future surveillance conducted by ‘ultraquiet drones’ and other high-tech devices.” State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1172–73 (N.M.
2015) (finding that the aerial surveillance from a helicopter searching for marijuana plants
“amounted to an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment and reverse the Court
of Appeals’ determination to the contrary”).
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free society do not expect to be subject to continuous government surveillance, even
as they walk or drive on public pathways.”264
How the information is being collected will likely tie in closely to the first factor
when reviewing the type of technology used, but the court must also explore how
that technology was used in the particular case in front of them. For example, the
duration of the surveillance, regardless of whether cameras, voice recording, or GPS
was utilized, becomes more unreasonable the longer the duration. The Court in
Knotts and United States v. Jones both looked at the duration of surveillance, which
will act as a base for courts considering durational surveillance with drones under
this factor because, unlike the GPS surveillance at issue in Knotts and Jones, the
surveillance capability of drones is substantially more comprehensive.
Before the advent of GPS devices, it would have been close to impossible from
a practical and financial standpoint for the government to track every movement an
individual made in his car every minute for four weeks. Devices like the GPS at
issue in Jones, or drones, “make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”265
Therefore, the “best that we can do . . . is to apply existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”266 Justice
Alito concludes that, unlike “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets”267 the four-week-long secret monitoring and
cataloging of every single movement of a vehicle is not in accord with “expectations
of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”268
Further, when surveillance becomes continuous and for extensive durations, the
line between monitoring the public and “search” blurs, posing Fourth Amendment
issues. Marc Jonathan Blitz puts forth the following Constitutional law query: “As
police gain the ability to technologically monitor individuals’ public movements and
activities, does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against ‘unreasonable searches’
place any hurdles in their way?”269 Blitz posits that the Supreme Court answered the
question affirmatively in Jones in two separate concurring opinions signed on by
five different justices. However, he critiques the suggestion in the concurring
opinions in Jones on two primary grounds: first, they do not provide guidance on
where the line should be drawn regarding when public surveillance “morphs from a
means by which police monitor public space into a Fourth Amendment ‘search.’”270
In other words, the justices did not identify when surveillance becomes so long or
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Blitz, supra note 10, at 33.
United Sates v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical.”).
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Id. at 430.
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so comprehensive that it could be said “to cross the constitutional dividing line.”271
Second, the concurring opinions fail to address why the Fourth Amendment would
cover electronic surveillance like that at issue in Jones, but not apply to around the
clock surveillance by the police.272
As technology develops to allow law enforcement to continuously follow
individuals and track all of their movements,273 the importance of considering the
duration of the surveillance becomes even more critical. Doing so will address
concerns involving privacy. It will place limits on the possibility that a drone can
monitor an individual’s day-to-day activities.
In addition to considering the duration and continuation of the surveillance, the
court should consider the location of the technology, looking to the aerial
surveillance trilogy cases for guidance. For example, in Riley, the altitude of the
helicopter was of great interest to the Court. Specifically, in her concurring opinion,
Justice O’Connor argued that the defining question was “whether the helicopter was
in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with
sufficient regularity that Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was
not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”274 Distinguishing Riley
from the Court’s opinion in Ciraolo, Justice O’Connor opined:
Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the
airplane was operating where it had a “right to be,” but because public air
travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is
unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will
not be observed from the air at that altitude.275
...
If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the
observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used by
the public and Riley cannot be said to have “knowingly expose[d]” his
greenhouse to public view.276
While currently seeing a drone may not be as routine as seeing an airplane or
helicopter high above your property, given that approximately seven million drones
271
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are likely to be in the airspace by 2020 they will soon seem as common as seeing a
flock of birds.
Thus, under this second factor, the court will move from determining what
technologies the drone employed to looking at how the technologies were used in
the case before them. This factor is important because a drone simply housing
several technologies and flying above may not in itself interfere with one’s privacy,
but if those technologies are used for extensive periods of time and from improper
locations, society will be less likely to deem the use of drones acceptable.
C. How Pervasive Is the Privacy Intrusion?
Finally, the court should look to how pervasive the intrusion is277 and what
information has been collected, considering such things as whether the home is
involved, whether intimate details of an individual’s life are exposed, and whether
access was gained to an item, like a cell phone, that contains a vast amount of
information.278 How personal is the information being collected?279 Will it be
embarrassing or stigmatizing?
Scholar Stephen E. Henderson looked at how personal the information is that
is sought after in considering the reasonableness of the surveillance. He posits that
where information can routinely be accessed by others, it is typically not considered
personal.280
But there may be instances in which the type of information is personal—
it is intimate and social norms typically keep such information within
one’s social network—but nonetheless certain such information is not
only accessible to, but is routinely accessed by, persons having no
authorization from the person to whom the information relates.281
277
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Further, the personal nature of the collected information may need to be
considered from a subjective standpoint: “the reasonableness of one’s expectation
of privacy tends to be assessed through the lens of one’s own experience.”282
Cultural and ever-evolving societal norms will play a large part in a court’s
determination in the pervasiveness of the surveillance and whether it will or has
resulted in personal information that should afford one an expectation of privacy.
D. The Interplay Between Factors Two and Three
In determining the pervasiveness of the search and whether it results in
information that society seeks to protect, the court should consider each case through
the lens of the mosaic theory: whether factor two, how the information is collected,
results in uncovering personal and private information. The mosaic theory was first
introduced in United States v. Maynard,283 the D.C. Circuit opinion that was a
precursor to Jones. In Maynard, Jones argued that the government placing a GPS
device on his car and tracking his movements for four weeks was an unreasonable
search.284 In holding that the use of a GPS device was a violation of Jones’s Fourth
Amendment rights, the court introduced the mosaic theory.285 This theory is largely
based on the idea that “[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not
revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he
does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.”286
That is, it is an approach to the Fourth Amendment whereby actions by the
police in isolation do not count as a search but do as they are aggregated. “[U]nder
the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather
than as individual steps.”287 Effectively, the longer the duration, the more pervasive
the surveillance may become.
In Jones, the Supreme Court demonstrated discomfort with applying Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy standard but also failed to adopt the D.C. Circuit
Court’s mosaic theory argument. While declining to adopt the mosaic theory,
however, five justices in concurrences (or at least joining concurrences)
acknowledged it. Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s concurrences mention it but do not
go into extensive detail about it.288 Justice Alito, however, relies on the reasoning of
the D.C. Circuit in Maynard to explain why the long-term surveillance in Jones
282
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would be a search while the short-term search in Knotts was not.289 Conversely,
Justice Sotomayor was less direct in her reference to the mosaic theory in positing
that when determining whether police behavior constitutes a search, courts consider
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated” in this way.290
Many scholars have been critical of the mosaic theory for reasons focusing on
administrability, duration, and pervasiveness. Most notably, Professor Orin Kerr has
been critical of the mosaic theory based on what he perceives as its inherent lack of
administrability.291 According to Professor Kerr:
The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search
doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in
isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the mosaic
theory asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation
amount to a search when considered as a group.292
Marc Jonathan Blitz advocates for not considering a duration of the search or
pervasiveness of the search component because doing so “spares the courts the task
of seeking some elusive or arbitrary point in the duration or intensity of a search at
which such monitoring morphs from being just another means by which police
watch over public space into a possible violation of the Constitution.”293 Under
Blitz’s proposed test, duration is, by design, irrelevant. “After police begin recording
events outside of their presence, it does not matter whether they do so for two
minutes or two weeks.”294
And yet, ignoring both the duration and pervasiveness of the search tips the
scale too far toward administrability in terms of the balance between court
administrability and privacy. Yes, it spares the court the task of determining where
to draw the line, but, at the expense of not taking into consideration that the invasion
of privacy is undoubtedly considerably higher when the surveillance is longer and
more pervasive. Blitz also advocates for avoiding duration and persistence as part of
the test because doing so “parallels the way that courts typically define Fourth
Amendment searches in private spaces.”295 That is, outside of exigent
circumstances.296
According to Stephen Henderson, the state took an “egregious position” when
it argued that law enforcement could use GPS to track the movements of anyone for
289
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nearly a month without a warrant.297 On the one hand, given the state of Fourth
Amendment law at the time, Jones could have (and, as some would argue, should
have) been seen as merely an extension of Knotts.
That said, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
generally the police may not, “without a warrant, search digital information on a cell
phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”298 Although Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence undoubtedly differs in the context of a search incident to
arrest, it was the Court’s willingness in Riley to view cell phone technology
differently from other objects, given a cell phone’s immense storage capacity and
the pervasiveness of the data that is accumulated299 that may signal a willingness on
the part of the Court to consider the pervasiveness of drone technology.
Because of the multiple technologies that may be utilized at the same time on a
single drone, courts should consider each action taken by the government in the
surveillance and the combined effect of the surveillance to determine whether there
has been a search and an individual’s right to privacy has been usurped. Using this
three-factor test, the court will consider the drone itself—the size, capabilities, and
appearance—the technologies attached to it, the extent of the surveillance, and its
accompanied pervasiveness.
CONCLUSION
The advances in technology that have resulted in the increase in the prediction
as to the number of drones that may soon be in our skies—as many as seven million
in 2020 alone—serve as a call to action. It serves as a call to action for those
concerned with protecting individuals’ privacy without imprudently inhibiting the
ability of law enforcement. It also serves as a call to action for those concerned with
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focusing on the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard. If the Federal Aviation Administration itself
predicted six years ago that there would be 15,000 drones sold annually and today
places that number at seven million, how can law enforcement and the courts
determine what the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy should be regarding
drones? If the technology advances allow for nearly constant increases in
surveillance capabilities of drones from an amalgamation of technologies, it is time
for the Court to deconstruct its broad “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine.
This Article has proposed three factors that the Court should take into account
to determine whether police are required to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause. Essentially, courts should first apply a presumption that a warrant is necessary
absent exigent circumstances300 in instances where the police are surveying homes
297
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or its curtilage when using drones. Given the myriad surveillance technologies
potentially contained within a single drone, they are simply not like any other
singular technology. The potential for a literal “invasion of privacy” is too great.
Therefore, a presumption that a warrant is required will combat the increased
potential of Fourth Amendment infringement. The burden would then be on law
enforcement to demonstrate why it should not have been required to obtain a warrant
given the multifactor test of viewing the surveillance technology in use, the extent
of the surveillance, and the pervasiveness of the privacy intrusion.

persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’”).

